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Disagreeing in context
Teresa Marques*
Law Department, Philosophy of Law Area, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative
predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are
to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made
in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011;
Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently
defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that
it faces the problem of lost disagreement. These authors have proposed that a proper
account of the resilient disagreement in the cases studied is to be achieved by an appeal
to pragmatic processes, and to conflicting non-doxastic attitudes. It is argued here that
the existing contextualist solutions are incomplete as they stand, and are subject to
objections because of this. A supplementation of contextualism is offered, together with
an explanation of why failed presuppositions of commonality (López de Sa), disputes
over the appropriateness of a contextually salient standard (Sundell), and differences in
non-doxastic attitudes (Sundell, Huvenes, Marques, and García-Carpintero) give rise to
conflicts. This paper claims that conflicts of attitudes are the reason why people still have
impressions of disagreement in spite of failed commonality presuppositions, that those
conflicts drive metalinguistic disputes over the selection of appropriate standards, and
hence conflicting non-doxastic attitudes demand an explanation that is independent of
those context dependent pragmatic processes. The paper further argues that themissing
explanation is 2-fold: first, disagreement prevails where the properties expressed by taste
and value predicates are response-dependent properties, and, secondly, it prevails where
those response-dependent properties are involved in evolved systems of coordination
that respond to evolutionarily recurrent situations.
Keywords: contextualism in semantics, disagreement, conflicting attitudes, de nobis attitudes, dispositional
evaluative properties
1. Introduction
When people have disagreements about taste, or about aesthetic or moral values, what is their dis-
agreement about? What explains the apparent fact that it is legitimate for people to hold on to
their views about the issue under discussion? And what explains that the disagreements at stake
are often resilient and persistent? Is there an account of this kind of disagreement that can capture
the perspective dependence of a given domain while preserving the sense of resilient disagreement
between those with different perspectives?
In the recent debate that has opposed contextualists to relativists about predicates of personal
taste, aesthetics, and morality, contextualists have tried to resist objections raised by non-indexical
contextualists and assessment-relativists by adopting two distinct strategies. The first strategy is to
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argue that none of the relativist positions now available fare
better than contextualist ones1. The second strategy is to show
how resilient disagreements are to be explained. On the one
hand, contextualists have appealed to a combination of prag-
matic mechanisms to account for these disagreements: presup-
positions of commonality,2 and to further metalinguistic con-
siderations about the choice of salient standards3. Contextualists
have also added a more thorough explanation of the practical
dimension of the disagreements at stake, for instance appeal-
ing to conflicts of non-doxastic attitudes4. Neither of these
approaches—the pragmatic or the attitudinal—have been suf-
ficiently developed so far. In this paper, I will indicate which
aspects are still wanting. What is required is an account that
frames both the pragmatic and the conative aspects within an
explanation of inter-subjective or group coordination. The paper
further argues that the missing account is 2-fold: first, disagree-
ment prevails where the properties expressed by taste and value
predicates are response-dependent properties, and, secondly, it
prevails where those response-dependent properties are involved
in evolved systems of coordination that respond to evolutionarily
recurrent situations.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present
and indicate what is lacking in the otherwise promising contex-
tualist proposals mentioned here. Thus, in Section 2.1, I show
that appealing to presuppositions of commonality by itself is
insufficient, because in other similar cases the awareness that
a presupposition fails dispels the impression of disagreement.
In Section 2.2, I consider Sundell’s suggestion that the disputes
take place at a metalinguistic level, and that in some of the rel-
evant cases what is at stake is the choice of a salient standard.
One problem with this proposal is that we need a better under-
standing of how disputes of this sort are to be adjudicated, and
of what motivates speakers to pursue them. A further problem
for both pragmatic explanations is that we have the impression
that there are disagreements between subjects who are not part
of the same conversational setting, or do not even interact in
any form. Both presuppositions of commonality and metalin-
guistic disputes seem to require that some interaction exists.
In Section 2.3, I raise a problem for solutions that rely on the
incompatibility of (pro) attitudes. The most plausible explana-
tion for the source of conflict—preclusion of joint satisfaction—
seems not to yield the desired result. Nonetheless, I think these
three proposals made on behalf of contextualism are basically
correct.
Section 3 offers the beginning of a solution. In Section 3.1, I
suggest that we should follow Lewis and Hume in treating practi-
cal agreements as solutions to coordination problems. Disagree-
ments would arise when people’s dispositions are obstacles to
coordination. The suggestion is supported by research on group
action and rationality. In Section 3.2, I offer a conjecture that
can resolve the objections raised against contextualism. The main
problems are, first, that we have impressions of disagreement
even where subjects do not share a conversational setting, do not
1See for instance (Glanzberg, 2007; Stojanovic, 2007; Rosenkranz, 2008; Schaffer,
2009; Coliva and Moruzzi, 2012; Marques, 2014a,b).
2See (López de Sa, 2008; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014).
3See (Sundell, 2011).
4See (Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014).
know of each other, and do not have common goals. Second, we
have impressions of disagreement even when the apparent dispo-
sitions revealed in the disagreement can be satisfied. My conjec-
ture is that the kind of coordination problems that the different
types of dispute pose are at the root of our having, as humans,
evolved to have the emotional responses we have, to make value
judgments about matters of taste, aesthetics or morality, and, cru-
cially, to hear conflicts in the expressions of different personal
preferences. This section reviews some research that corroborates
this conjecture.
In Section Section 4, I examine the consequences of the
proposal offered here for the current debate between contex-
tualists and relativists. First, disagreement prevails where the
properties expressed by taste and value predicates are response-
dependent properties, and, second, it prevails where those
response-dependent properties are (i) de nobis;5 and (ii) involved
in evolved systems of coordination that respond to evolutionarily
recurrent situations.
2. Contextualist Strategies
Why be a contextualist in the first place?
Contextualism (also called “indexical relativism” by Kölbel
(2004), or “indexical contextualism”) is a semantic thesis. A con-
textualist about a given class k of expressions holds that an utter-
ance u of a sentence S where a k-expression occurs as made at a
given context C expresses a proposition p at C that is evaluated
with respect to < w >C, the world of the context C. The class
k is composed of expressions whose characters compositionally
determine in context what content or proposition is expressed
by an utterance of a sentence that contains a k-expression, and
the content determined varies from context of use to context of
use. The content or proposition expressed is then a function from
possible circumstances of evaluation to extensions (in the case of
sentences, to truth-values).
As Kölbel (2004) says, contextualists allow for different utter-
ances of the same sentence to express different contents. An utter-
ance expresses a given proposition as its content, and that con-
tent’s truth will only be relative to possible worlds (as standard
semantic theories require). Truth-relativists (moderate, i.e., non-
indexical relativists, or radical, i.e., assessment-relativists), allow
for the truth of the content expressed in context to depend on
more than (just) a possible world.
Contextualism has both a linguistic and a metaphysical moti-
vation. Speakers’ judgments and linguistic intuitions are nor-
mally used in favor of contextualism in the various domains
where contextualism has been defended, in particular judgments
concerning:
(a) What is said;
(b) Whether what is said is true or false;
5De nobis are plural de se attitudes. Where de se attitudes are specific kinds of
attitudes or mental states about oneself, de nobis attitudes are a specific kind of
attitudes or mental states about ourselves. There are well-known motivations for
de se thought, and different theories that try to accommodate what is essentially
de se in thought. In Marques (Unpublished Manuscript), I draw a parallel between
de se and de nobis attitudes by showing that the same reasons that support the
existence of a distinctive kind of first-personal attitudes can be replicated for the
first-personal plural case.
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(c) On disagreement between people making different claims
within any of these domains.
Yet, the available data on speaker’s intuitions is not, at least not
conclusively, decisive for contextualism, as relativist objections
make clear. In the current debate about the meaning of predicates
of personal taste and other evaluative predicates, several authors
have raised objections against contextualist approaches, mainly
on the basis that contextualism misses intuitions of disagreement
that these writers show we have. The problem, as they argue, is
that of lost disagreement.
Thus, Kölbel (2004) argues on this basis for what is usually
called “moderate truth-relativism” (also known as “non-indexical
contextualism,” by contrast with the more standard contextualist
views). Egan (2010), Lasersohn (2005), and MacFarlane (2014)
have argued for another version that can be called “assessment-
relativism.” As this paper is not dedicated to discussing the
limitations that either form of relativism may have in account-
ing for disagreement, I will not explain here the differences
between these views. In any case, further arguments must be pro-
vided to settle this discussion, preferably arguments that assume
some common ground with relativists. By framing the discussion
within a broad dispositionalist metaphysical theory, I am sharing
at least this common ground with relativists6.
There are good reasons for a relational metaphysical account
of the properties expressed by predicates like “is funny,” “is dis-
gusting,” “is tasty,” “is beautiful,” “is good,” etc. It seems highly
implausible that claims about, for example, humor, taste, aes-
thetic value, and perhaps moral value, should be independent of
how people react to funny, disgusting, tasty, or beautiful things.
An analogy with other dispositional properties can be help-
ful in understanding the motivation for a relational account of
the relevant evaluative properties. Recently, Cohen (2009) argued
that a metaphysical view of this kind about colors has a natu-
ral contextualist semantic implementation. Cohen draws atten-
tion to the fact that a single color stimulus can produce multiple
psychophysically distinguishable perceptual effects in respect of
color. He further adds that there is no well-motivated reason for
thinking that just one of those variants is veridical. Thus, he con-
cludes, predicates like “red” express relational properties, more
specifically “response-dependent” ones such as looking red to sub-
jects of kind S under circumstances K. By analogy with the color
case, we can say that aesthetic and taste predicates—and perhaps
moral predicates—express relational properties. A predicate like
“is tasty,” or “is disgusting,” uttered in context C, expresses prop-
erties such as tasty for the perceivers relevant in context C under
the perceptual circumstances relevant in C, or simply tasty for the
standard relevant in C.
For the rest of the paper, I will assume that a disposi-
tional account of the properties expressed by many evaluative
predicates is correct, and that aesthetic, taste, humor, and moral
6See for instance (Egan, 2012). The present paper can be seen as offering a justifica-
tion for maintaining the more classic dispositional theory, instead of the relativist
modification offered by Egan. In Marques (Unpublished Manuscript), I argue that
Egan’s de se version of dispositionalism about values fails to accommodate con-
flicting attitudes, and, given the nature of the theory, it also fails to accommodate
doxastic disagreement.
predicates express relational properties. Saying this is not settling
who the “subjects of kind S” are for each relational property. In
some cases, one may expect universality (everyone) and in other
cases expectations of universality might be unjustified.
It does not follow that any possible claims in matters of taste,
or morality, exhibit such variability, and the extent to which there
is any variability at all may vary between domains. Perhaps there
is more variability in claims onmatters of taste, and less in moral-
ity. Concrete sociological, historical or anthropological analysis
would need to corroborate the actual degree to which such a
variability exists.
The aim of this paper is to show that a contextualist can
explain the resilient cases of disagreement, and, in so doing, take
the wind out of the relativist’s sails. The remainder of this sec-
tion reviews three ways for a contextualist to secure disagree-
ment: presuppositions of commonality, metalinguistic disputes,
and conflicts of non-doxastic attitudes.
2.1. Presuppositions of Commonality
López de Sa (2008) and López de Sa (2015) defends contextual-
ism (indexical relativism) from criticism based on disagreement
data by pointing out that the proper semantic implementation of
the proposal should envisage the presuppositions of commonal-
ity that assertions expressing judgments of taste carry. Accord-
ing to him, the failure of these presuppositions accounts for the
data. The main problem with López de Sa’s proposal, as I see
it, is that when presuppositions of the kind he envisages fail,
we should not feel that any relevant disagreement remains. This
is corroborated in the case of gradable adjectives like “rich” or
“tall.” But a strong impression of disagreement is still felt even by
semantically enlightened speakers, which cannot be explained by
semantically blind folk invariantist intuitions.
Consider the following exchange between Clarissa and Jen-
nifer, both excellent cooks with vast experience and good taste7.
1. (a) Clarissa: Cow’s tongue is disgusting.
(b) Jennifer: No, it’s not disgusting; it’s delicious.
People feel that Clarissa and Jennifer straightforwardly disagree.
On contextualist semantics, however, if the relevant standard of
taste is subject-relative, in their context the claims are equivalent
to these:8
2. (a) Clarissa: Cow’s tongue is disgusting [given Clarissa’s
standards].
(b) Jennifer: No, it’s not disgusting, it’s delicious [given
Jennifer’s standards].
There seems to be no impression of disagreement in (2). In fact,
as Kölbel (2004) points out, now both speakers can rationally
accept what the other has said while maintaining their respective
assertions, unlike what seemed to be the case in (1).
These are cases of what Egan (2010, p. 251) calls first-
personally committed (auto-centric) uses, to be distinguished
7The example honors Clarissa Dickson Wright and Jennifer Paterson, the Two Fat
Ladies.
8Assuming subject-relative standards here plays a dialectical role. Many authors in
the literature assume subject-relative standards, and most objections to relativism
focus on individual standards of taste.
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from sympathetic (exocentric) uses in which we ascribe tastes by
adopting alien perspectives (“that fodder must be delicious”).
Yet, the contextualist acknowledges that there must be cases of
pointless disputes, where subjects have contrasting sensibilities.
Subjects are thereby either expressing different relational proper-
ties (or wrongly purporting to express an inexistent one shared
by both of them). (1) is an example of such a case of a “faultless”
dispute—one that does not involve any doxastic disagreement
over a unique context-dependent content that Clarissa accepts
and Jennifer rejects. But how will the contextualist explain the
persisting intuitions of disagreement concerning such cases?
López de Sa’s explanation (López de Sa, 2008, pp. 304–305)
appeals to presuppositions of commonality. The relevant predi-
cate “triggers the presupposition that the participants in the con-
versation are similar” with respect to the relevant standard. López
de Sa assumes a Stalnakerian account of presuppositions (cf.
Stalnaker, 2002). On this account, presuppositions are require-
ments on the “common ground” (the class of propositions that
participants in the conversation take to be known by all, known
to be known by all, etc) that may be triggered by specific expres-
sions or constructions. Utterances carrying the presuppositions
are not felicitous unless the common ground includes them, or, if
it does not, they are “accommodated” by the conversational par-
ticipants, i.e., included in the common ground as a result of the
utterance.
Impressions of disagreement in (1) are then explained because
“in any non-defective conversation. . . it would indeed be com-
mon ground” that the participants are relevantly alike. In such a
conversation, one would be right and the other wrong. Of course,
in (1) the presupposition fails, and as a result both claims are infe-
licitous. In other words, the impression of disagreement is to be
explained by the fact that the following conditional is true about
(1): had Clarissa and Jennifer been in a felicitous context in which
the presupposition of a common standard was met, then they
would have disagreed9.
But impressions of disagreement in analogous cases also dis-
appear, as witnessed by the case of the vagueness-inducing rela-
tivity to “perspectives” or “ways of drawing the line” for gradable
adjectives, as the example offered below illustrates10. However,
such impressions remain among the fully reflective in the case of
judgments of taste like the ones considered here. The comparison
with gradable adjectives shows that the presuppositional account
does not help.
The next example (originally from Richard, 2004) suggests the
indexicality of gradable adjectives—adjectives that admit com-
parative and superlative degrees, intensifiers like “much” and
“very,” and so on, and illustrates how an impression of disagree-
ment should disappear once different standards of wealth are
9Baker (2012) criticizes this proposal. He invokes three commonly accepted tests
for presuppositions (cf. von Fintel, 2004), and points out that they do not appear to
support López de Sa’s claims. For discussion, see (Marques and García-Carpintero,
2014); the presentation of the discussion in this section summarizes our work in
that paper.
10Kennedy (2007) and Kennedy and McNally (2010), for instance, argue for a
contextualist treatment for relative gradable adjectives such as “tall” or ‘rich,”
although not for absolute gradable adjectives like “spotted” or “full.” Thanks to
an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
made explicit. Imagine that Mary wins a million dollar lottery.
Didi is impressed; but for Naomi, a million dollars is not much.
Taking New Yorkers to be the relevant fields of comparison, they
judge:
3. (a) Didi: Mary is rich.
(b) Naomi: Mary is not rich.
The information about differential standards of richness pro-
vided by context, which accounts for the intuition that different
contents are being affirmed and denied in (3a) and (3b), can in
some other cases be explicitly articulated in the uttered sentence:
1. (a) Didi, as before: Mary is rich (given Didi’s standard).
(b) Naomi, as before: Mary is not rich (given Naomi’s
standard).
This evidence can be handled by means of a contextualist pro-
posal, following suggestions about the semantics of gradable
adjectives in the literature. Assuming that the speaker’s inten-
tions play a crucial role in determining degree significance, Didi
and Naomi either do not disagree, or participate in an infelici-
tous conversation where presuppositions of commonality fail. The
problem for López de Sa’s proposal is that the impression of dis-
agreement also vanishes among semantically enlightened speak-
ers in this case. However, his counterfactual still applies: Didi and
Naomi would be disagreeing, if they were speaking in a felicitous
context. Didi’s possible reply to (3b) illustrates this.
4. (a) Didi: Mary is rich given what counts as rich for me; I see
that you have a different perspective on these matters.
Therefore, what explains the impression of resilient disagreement
between Clarissa and Jennifer in (1) cannot be that a counterfac-
tual of that sort applies. A proposal along the lines of López de
Sa’s might be the beginning of an explanation of such a percep-
tion of disagreement. However, as (4) and (5) show, the presence
of presuppositions of commonality is not enough to explain the
perception of disagreement that remains even for the semanti-
cally enlightened subjects who adopt a contextualist semantics for
value predicates11.
2.2. Metalinguistic Disputes
Sundell (2011) advances a well-argued defense of contextualism
for predicates of personal taste and aesthetics that makes some
progress with respect to the position held by López de Sa. Sun-
dell argues, on the one hand, that impressions of disagreement or
conflict as the ones we have with (1) also exist in the cases where it
is clear that the asserted sentences not only do not contradict each
other, but are in fact both true. On the other hand, by appealing
to pragmatic and metalinguistic processes, he shows how many
of the disputes of this kind can be analyzed as disputes over the
selection or appropriateness of a contextually salient standard. I
11It might be questioned that the impression of disagreement is anyway resilient in
the dialogue between Clarissa and Jennifer even for semantically enlightened sub-
jects, after Jennifer says, for instance, “Cow’s tongue is delicious given what counts
as delicious for me; I see that you have different tastes.” Perhaps it is not obvi-
ous that there is a resilient sense of disagreement, but I am taking as veridical the
reports given by many people that even after a qualification of this kind is made,
they still perceive a conflict between Jennifer and Clarissa.
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am sympathetic to Sundell’s proposal, as I am to López de Sa’s.
But once more, as it stands, it is incomplete.
As indicated, a contextualist about the meaning of predicates
of personal taste (and other predicates) should acknowledge that
the perception of disagreement that is left in cases like (1) cannot
be accounted for as a straightforward case of doxastic disagree-
ment. For present purposes, let us accept that when two peo-
ple doxastically disagree, the following inter-subjective doxastic
attitude incompatibility holds:
2.2.1. Doxastic Attitude Incompatibility
If subject A’s attitude is correct, then subject B’s attitude cannot
be correct12.
The occurrence of doxastic disagreement justifies the disap-
proval of other people’s doxastic attitudes. But the notion of
doxastic disagreement does not play any role in a contextualist
account of the remaining impression of disagreement between
enlightened subjects in (1). Both utterances, Clarissa’s and Jen-
nifer’s, express true propositions. Now, as López de Sa suggests,
the impression of doxastic disagreement may be explained by
errors about contextual presuppositions. But once we acknowl-
edge that those presuppositions fail, the impression of disagree-
ment should also vanish.
Thus, if in the following dialogue, Clarissa takes a visible male
to be the salient one referred to by “he” in that context and Jen-
nifer objects because she takes the salient male to be the person
the previous discourse was about, any impression of doxastic
disagreement vanishes when they become aware that they have
different referential presuppositions.
5. (a) Clarissa: He is Scottish.
(b) Jennifer: He is not Scottish.
(c) Clarissa: He is Scottish, because the salient male I meant
was not the one you have in mind but that one. [pointing
to the visible person].
It is naturally possible to feel a disagreement about a “metalin-
guistic” proposition (concerning who is the salient male in the
context, the referent of “he”), especially if participants have com-
mon knowledge about the nationalities of the visible male and
the one previously spoken about, and Jennifer places a proper
emphasis on her token of “he.” In this case, Jennifer’s objection
is similar to the one metalinguistically expressed by (6c).
Sundell (2011) resists the disagreement-based arguments of
relativists that target contextualism. According to him, both intu-
itive impressions of disagreement or conflict, and disagreement
indicated by uses of denial, ormetalinguistic negation,13 are com-
patible with the absence of some forms of doxastic disagreement.
He argues that many intuitive impressions of disagreement can
be explained as cases of conflicting non-doxastic attitudes (p.
271), for instance, those manifested in this variation over (1):
6. (a) Jennifer: I really like cow’s tongue.
(b) Clarissa: Well, I don’t like it!
(c) Clarissa: # Nope/Nuh uh, I don’t like it.
12For more on doxastic disagreement and exclusion, see (Marques, 2014a).
13See (Horn, 1989; Carston, 1998, 1999).
There is a perception of disagreement or conflict in (7a) and
(7b), even though it is clear that the contents asserted by Clarissa
and Jennifer are consistent—both are actually true. But Clarissa’s
disagreement with Jennifer would not have been felicitous if
expressed via the denial in (7c). Disputes like the one in (7a)
and (7b) should rather be explained by appealing to conflicting
non-doxastic attitudes.
As an improvement over the notions of substantial disagree-
ment that he discusses, Sundell proposes that we accept as (a kind
of) disagreement “the relation between speakers that licenses lin-
guistic denial” (Sundell, 2011, p. 274). Sundell gives us some
examples that illustrate the variety of denial-licensing disputes.
They cover presupposition disagreement [illustrated by (6a)–(6c)
above], implicature, manner, character (after Kaplan, 1989), and
finally context disagreement.
Context disagreement can include cases where sentences like
those in (3) are uttered (Sundell, 2011, pp. 278–279). Consider
this variation of the example. Adapting the point made by Barker
(2002), we can imagine a case where Naomi is visiting Athens,
and is curious to know what nowadays counts as rich in Greece.
In reply, Didi utters (3a), “Mary is rich.” In so doing, Didi is
giving “some guidance concerning the relevant standard” for
richness in Greece. Barker considers these as metalinguistic uses
of gradable adjectives, uses that “produce a context-sharpening
effect” (Barker, 2002, p. 1) (see also García-Carpintero, 2008 for a
similar discussion). If these uses exist, then we can conceive of a
dispute between Didi and Naomi that concerns what the relevant
standard of richness is in their context, a dispute which can be
expressed by (3a) and (3b). In other words, “if context sharpen-
ing is a commonly available mode of conveying information, then
a natural prediction is that such information is a possible focus of
dispute” (Sundell, 2011, p. 279).
There is however a further possible kind of context disagree-
ment. Not only can people dispute which is the contextually
salient standard in a conversation, speakers can also dispute
which standard should be adopted, when none is settled. There are
two issues that need further explaining. One concerns the con-
textual disagreements where speakers dispute which contextual
standard should be selected. How are such disputes to be adju-
dicated? A second related issue concerns rather what drives such
disputes?
Presumably, there is nothing prior to some aesthetic disputes
or disputes over matters of taste about which standard to adopt
when nothing in the context settles a standard. There are no
doubt culture-wide paradigms of beauty that are part of the back-
ground of many aesthetic disputes, and likewise for discussions
over matters of taste, etc. But culture-wide paradigms do not suf-
fice to resolve all such disputes. They cannot settle, for example, a
disagreement over who is more truthful to nature, Turner or the
pre-Raphaelites.
Where nothing prior settles a dispute, a plausible hypoth-
esis to explain the persistency of a disagreement is that in
those cases conflicts of pro-attitudes merge with contextual
disagreements (discarding other explanations for persistence,
such as lack of knowledge of the nature of the dispute, of the
relevant background, individual stubbornness, etc.) In a dispute
of the kind now contemplated, each speaker tries to impose her
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 257
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own standard as the salient standard of the context, insofar as
the speakers are motivated to push their own standard. But why
should anyone do so? In other words, why would anyone want
her own perspective on the things she appreciates (or doesn’t) to
be the perspective that others also have about what they appreci-
ate (or don’t)? If we assume that there is reason to treat different
perceptions of taste as equally veridical, it becomes evident that
an explanation of how these different perceptions can ground
conflicts is missing from most of the recent literature on these
issues.
2.3. Conflict
Huvenes (2012) discusses examples similar to (7), “I like cow’s
tongue”/ “Well, I don’t!.” He considers whether examples of this
kind [and others, like (1)] admit linguistic denials, and other
markers of disagreement like “that’s not true”/ “that’s false” or
“I disagree.” He argues that considerations having to do with
disagreement do not undermine contextualism. Like Sundell,
Huvenes also considers that there are a variety of forms of dis-
agreement. He tries to defend the idea that two people can dis-
agree, even if they both speak truthfully. These are the cases like
(7), where speakers voice their different dispositions toward given
foods. Huvenes mentions that the idea of appealing to conflict-
ing pro-attitudes, desires or preferences, is not original. His idea
is to use the distinction (Stevenson, 1963) made between “dis-
agreement in belief” and “disagreement in attitudes,” i.e., between
doxastic and non-doxastic disagreement. Although the idea of
conflicting conative attitudes is assumed to play a role in conflicts
over evaluative matters in general, it is seldom explained.
The first chapter of Stevenson (1963) is dedicated to the
nature of ethical disagreement, and the book starts by drawing
the above mentioned distinction between doxastic and cona-
tive attitude disagreement, a distinction that philosophers, but
mostly meta-ethicists, have assumed to exist ever since it was
made. Expressivists (Stevenson, 1963, Blackburn, 1984 or Gib-
bard, 1990), relativists (Egan, 2012; MacFarlane, 2014), and con-
textualists (Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-
Carpintero, 2014; Marques, Unpublished Manuscript, etc.) all
embrace it.
We are concerned with the possibility of conflicting conative
attitudes accounting for the resilient impressions of disagreement
that most theorists argue exist in the cases under consideration.
How should conflicting attitudes be explained? Two hypotheses
for the conditions under which attitudinal conflicts occur have
been put forward in the literature. The first condition is one of
subjective rationality, and the second is one of satisfaction.
The rationality condition is what Kölbel as in mind when
he describes disagreements thus: “we could not rationally accept
what the other has asserted without changing ourminds” (Kölbel,
2004, p. 305). The nature of the modality would need elucidation.
Moreover, attitudes that are not beliefs, i.e., are non-doxastic,
seem to raise further difficulties for a rationality constraint.
The satisfaction condition is what Stevenson has in mind
with that sense of disagreement that “involves an opposition
of attitudes both of which cannot be satisfied” (Stevenson,
1963, pp. 1–2). The two conditions can be summarized as
follows.
Rationality: It is not possible for an individual to rationally have
a pair of attitudes X and Y just in case there is an attitudinal con-
flict between subjects A and B when A has attitude X and B has
attitude Y .
Satisfaction: If a subject A’s attitude can be satisfied, then B’s
attitude cannot be satisfied.
We may however have reasons to doubt that RATIONALITY
is true. It is not clear whether it is ever irrational to have a pair of
conative attitudes like desires, or certain emotions (love and hate,
fear and hope, say). In his Treatise, Hume argued that
it is only in two senses, that any affection can be called unrea-
sonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy,
despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence
of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exert-
ing any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the
designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes
and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false supposi-
tions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understand-
ing can neither justify nor condemn it
Hume (1978, pp. II,iii,3, 415).
Both senses support the idea that the “unreasonableness” of the
passions depends on the possibility of their satisfaction (whether
their objects exist, and whether themeans to attain them are suffi-
cient). If Hume is right, then the individual rationality constraint
for conative attitudes depends on an individual satisfaction con-
dition. It is hence conceivable that someone is “not unreasonable”
for having two attitudes X and Y , even if there is an attitudinal
conflict between A’s attitude X and B’s attitude Y . Since we are
left with SATISFACTION as the real condition on the rationality
of attitudes, a question arises as to how it impacts on the existence
of inter-personal conflict.
For SATISFACTION to be an acceptable condition for con-
flict, more has to be said about why certain pairs of attitudes,
when held by two or more people, give rise to conflicts. Simply
mentioning that two attitudes cannot be both satisfied will not
account for many of the conflicts arising from the manifestation
of different dispositions. In other words, there are pairs of atti-
tudes held by different people that can be satisfied and nonetheless
the people at stake seem to be in conflict. If the conative attitudes
expressed are like those conveyed in (7) “I like cow’s tongue,”
and these are strictly individual dispositions, then clearly the atti-
tudes conveyed can be both satisfied. Since both dispositions or
desires toward cow’s tongue can be satisfied—Jennifer can eat
what she desires and Clarissa can refrain from eating what she
doesn’t desire—there seem to be no grounds for those attitudes
to be in conflict or incompatible, apart from the fact that they are
different14.
14Schroeder (2008) criticizes several versions of expressivism for failing to explain,
and merely assuming, that pairs of different conative attitudes are incompatible, or
inconsistent. He says “I think that none of these looks remotely satisfactory as an
expressivist explanation of why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murdering is not wrong’
are inconsistent. None answers the basic question of what makes disapproval
and tolerance of murdering inconsistent with one another. Each posits that there
are such mental states that are inconsistent with one another, but none explains
why” (Schroeder, 2008, p. 587). I agree with Schroeder’s criticism of expressivism.
Contextualists and relativists should be careful not to make the same mistake.
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On the other hand, having different desires, or desiring differ-
ent things, can’t be a basis by itself for conflict or disagreement,
as this example clearly illustrates: Jennifer quite fancies Ferrán
Adriá, but Clarissa fancies his brother Albert instead. There’s no
conflict there, surely. Difference in attitudes does not establish
conflict.
In what sense are Jennifer’s and Clarissa’s different disposi-
tions toward cow’s tongue in conflict? As long as they can con-
cur in not forcing their choices on each other, both can have
their preferences satisfied. Yet presumably we may still hear a
disagreement in straightforward expressions of preferences like
(7). An appeal to different individual dispositions by itself does
not explain why even in this case we hear them disagreeing. If
each of them is expressing a personal preference, with no con-
sequences for what the other will eat, where is the remaining
conflict?
Given that we have dismissed RATIONALITY, and that SAT-
ISFACTION seems unsatisfactory if the attitudes at stake are
purely first-personal singular, it seems to follow that we can
only read (7) as expressing conflict between two people inso-
far as we see it as an expression of an expected common dis-
position shared by Clarissa and Jennifer. And unless we have
a good explanation of why having the same dispositions mat-
ters, we will be incapable of explaining why people with dif-
ferent desires, preferences, or dispositions, have incompatible
attitudes, or of explaining the role of conative attitudes in con-
flicts about evaluative thought and discourse, for instance in
cases like (1)15.
A theorist that aims to account for evaluative dispositional
properties should answer several questions. (I) Are the disposi-
tional properties first-order or higher-order? (II) Are the disposi-
tions first-personal singular or plural? And (III) what is the nature
of the dispositions at stake?
I am inclined to opt for the higher order nature of these dis-
positions, because of examples of the following sort: Suppose I
have a terrible cold. I’ve lost my sense of smell and taste. I’m
offered a dish that has been prepared by the chef at my favorite
restaurant. There’s nothing he cooks that I don’t like, so although
I have not tried this one dish, I am almost certain it is deli-
cious. But the dish does not taste like anything to me now (and
I have never tried it before). It is not incoherent to believe “this
does not taste delicious to me now, but I know it is delicious.”
Mutatis mutandis for something cooked by a hypothetical friend
with terrible taste and poor hygiene habits. It is also, in sim-
ilar conditions, not incoherent to believe “this does not taste
bad to me now, but it is disgusting.” This speaks at least in
favor denoting by “disgusting”/ “delicious” whatever my gusta-
tory experience would be in ideal conditions, or at least in normal
conditions.
Are these dispositions first personal singular or plural? How
can I generalize from the cook at one of my favorite restau-
rants and the hypothetical friend with bad taste? Presumably my
generalization encompasses not just why the restaurant is good
for me (in normal or ideal conditions), or why my friend has
15For discussion and examples illustrating the need for a good theory of conflicting
conative attitudes, see (Lewis, 1989) and (Marques, Unpublished Manuscript).
terrible taste (for me in normal or ideal conditions) but for any-
one who is sufficiently like me in relevant respects (in constitution
or in cultural background, or whatever turns out to be the rel-
evant respects). But there is a further possible variation here,
depending on which evaluative property is expressed: who “we”
designates may vary from a large group—possibly everybody, to
a very small group—oneself only. Finally, what is the nature of
the dispositions at stake? The attitudes at stake may be desires,
but presumably they could be other more primitive emotional
reactions.
The hypothesis that “disgusting” expresses higher-order plural
dispositions, and not just first-personal singular first-order dis-
positional responses seems to be confirmed by Rozin and Fallon’s
work:
The notion that disgusting items taste bad may be problematic.
Whereas most people have never tasted most things they find
disgusting, they are convinced that these substances would taste
bad. Of course, bad refers not to sensory properties but to their
interpretation of them. Thus, even if ground dried cockroach
tasted just like sugar, if one knew it was cockroach, this partic-
ular sweet powder would taste bad... It is the subject’s conception
of the object, rather than the sensory properties of the object, that
primarily determines the hedonic value. Although certain strong
negative tastes (e.g., bitter tastes) may not be reversible by manip-
ulation of the object source or context, we suspect that any posi-
tive taste can be reversed by contextual or object information
(Rozin and Fallon, 1987, p. 24).
Now, David (Lewis, 1989) offers a schematic definition of what a
value is:
[S]omething of the appropriate category is a value if and only if
we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it
(Lewis, 1989, p. 68).
To value something is, for Lewis, to be in a certain sort of moti-
vational mental state: to desire to desire it. This guarantees the
internalist connection between value and motivation. Values are
the things that we are disposed to desire to desire in certain cir-
cumstances. There are two categories of such things: the states of
the world we desire to be the case, i.e., the propositions we desire
to be true. These are de dicto desires. And we also desire to be
in a certain way. These are de se desires. Lewis’s dispositionalist
theory fits well with the kind of relational account of evaluative
properties described by analogy with the color case in §2. On this
theory, to find that cow’s tongue is tasty is to be disposed in the
right way toward cow’s tongue, i.e., it is to value having pleas-
ant gustatory experiences when eating cow’s tongue. And to find
that cow’s tongue is disgusting is to be disposed in the right way
against cow’s tongue, i.e., to value not being in contact with cow’s
tongue.
On the Lewisian theory, the evaluative property expressed
involves the relevant group to which the speaker belongs. It is,
if we want, a first-person plural secondary property, or a de
nobis secondary property. The theory offers further advantages.
It is cognitivist, since it accounts for the evaluative property
expressed by the value predicate or word—and it can be true
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or false that cow’s tongue is tasty (or disgusting), and even
that Jennifer (or Clarissa) can be mistaken about cow’s tongue
being tasty or not. At the same time, the theory is sufficiently
subjectivist and dependent on people’s desires to accommodate
the perceived importance of conative attitudes in disputes of
taste16.
Group membership for the purposes of identifying the rele-
vant evaluative properties expressed by value terms cannot be
the sort of thing that depends exclusively on one’s occurrent
desires. One may be mistaken at a given moment about one’s
overall dispositions, and one’s occurrent desires may be affected
by extraneous causes. If this occurs in the personal case, a for-
tiori it can happen in the first-person plural case, and one may
be mistaken at any given time about what one’s group values.
Group identity and membership cannot depend exclusively on
one’s conversational interlocutors at a given moment. Because
of this, what we (i.e., me and people sufficiently like me in
the relevant respects) find delicious or disgusting is not deter-
mined by intra-conversational contextual factors, or at least, not
entirely.
If the disagreement in (1), as in (7), results from conflict-
ing dispositions and is about which standard should be adopted,
what exactly drives Clarissa and Jennifer to try to impose their
own standard? The previous paragraph indicates various ways
the “selection of a standard” or a “dispute over a standard” can
take place: people may be mistaken about what standards they
actually endorse, they may be mistaken about group member-
ship (who are “we”) or it may simply be indeterminate who
“we” are, or how “we” are to respond in ideal conditions. If and
when subjects are disputing which standard should be adopted,
they are disputing what they collectively should be disposed to
(dis)value.
To repeat, on a dispositional account of value along the lines of
Lewis’s, a standard of taste is a kind of dispositional property, the
disposition to value certain things. The dispositions at stake are
first-person plural. This should yield the desired result. Clarissa
finds cow’s tongue disgusting. The theory should ascribe to her
the disposition to value, i.e., to desire that we desire not to eat
cow’s tongue. Jennifer, however, desires that we desire to eat cow’s
tongue. Clarissa and Jennifer’s desires amount to a disagreement
in attitudes because they cannot be jointly satisfied at the same
world.
A remaining question is the following: Why does it matter
that people share a common value standard? In particular, why
does a shared standard matter for tasty or disgusting, but not for
16Anonymous referees pointed out that there seems to be a difference between
clearly evaluative predicates (moral terms for instance) and many taste predicates
of the kind discussed here. Although we may expect convergence, they suggested,
it would not be plausible to claim that “delicious” or “disgusting” express de nobis
dispositional properties. I admit that there may be some cases where apparent taste
predicates express first-personal singular, i.e., de se properties: a disposition to have
a certain response or reaction in the presence of certain substances. The present
account can be seen as defending an outline of the conditions a theory must sat-
isfy if it is to be evaluative and to allow for conflict and disagreement. Singular de
se dispositional properties can still be evaluative, but not allow for conflict or dis-
agreement. Singular first-order de se dispositional properties will not be evaluative
nor allow for conflict or disagreement.
fancying?17 The next section tries to offer an answer to this ques-
tion, relying on the role of coordination on the evolution of the
relevant dispositions.
3. Coordination
The beginning of a solution should take coordination into
account. Coordination plays a role in a different sense of agree-
ment to the ones discussed so far—namely, in the sense of
an agreement as a convention. For (Lewis, 1969), conventions
are solutions to coordination problems. Lewis follows Hume’s
account of convention and agreement in the Treatise:
It is only a general sense of common interest... I observe, that
it will be to my interest [e.g.,] to leave another in the posses-
sion of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with
regard to me. When this common sense of interest is mutually
expressed and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution
and behavior
(Hume, 1978, pp. III.ii.2, 490).
What connects coordination with the kind of de nobis disposi-
tions claimed to be central in evaluative properties?
Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sudgen (2007) have done a
considerable amount of work on the role of first-personal plu-
ral intentions in decision-theoretic reasoning irreducibly involv-
ing groups with which agents identify18. These dispositions are
essential for group cohesion. Let us call them “de nobis dispo-
sitions.” When Clarissa and Jennifer have de nobis dispositions,
there is an increased probability that their actions will be coor-
dinated with respect to an indefinite plurality of projects. An
explicit indication that the presupposition of commonality (see
López de Sa, 2008) fails, as in a metalinguistic expression of dis-
agreement over the relevant standard (see Sundell, 2011), man-
ifests the absence of such common de nobis dispositions, and it
may undermine group cohesion. This is the practical aspect that
is missing in other semantically similar cases, such as the dis-
agreement about being rich, or who “he” refers to. And it explains
where the conflict of attitudes arises.
I next offer a conjecture as to why we have such de nobis
dispositions.
3.1. A Conjecture
The conjecture advanced here involves various components. The
first is a commonly shared assumption among evolutionary cog-
nitive scientists, namely that various kinds of coordination prob-
lems are at the root of our having, as humans, evolved to have
the dispositions we have. The second component connects this
17As an anonymous referee pointed out, “tasty” and “disgusting” are adjectives
whereas “fancies” is a verb. I don’t think this affects the main point. The back-
ground story for taste adjectives of this kind is that they express certain kinds
of dispositions, namely dispositions that envolve desires. “Fancies” expresses the
occurrence of a given desire. The main point here is that the desires at stake appear
to be satisfiable and hence there’s an explanation of the conflict missing. The exam-
ple with “fancies” could be changed to an example with an adjective, for instance
“simply irresistible.”
18See also (Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014).
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evolutionary assumption with dispositional theories of value,
such as Lewis’s. As a result, value judgments about matters of
taste, aesthetics or morality are such that they both express dis-
positional properties and, crucially, reveal conflicts when dispo-
sitions vary. The present conjecture seems to be confirmed by
research in biology, evolutionary psychology and anthropology.
The conjecture, to be clear, is that our preference for some con-
verging dispositions, and our aversion to some diverging dispo-
sitions, has an evolutionary explanation connected with finding
needed solutions to recurrent coordination problems.
The conjecture is corroborated for instance by Tooby and
Cosmides’s work. Our distinctive capacity for cooperative behav-
ior was, they have argued, evolutionarily important for human
survival. Tooby and Cosmides (2010) summarizes many of their
results. According to them, alliances pose a “series of adap-
tive problems that selected for cognitive and motivational spe-
cializations for their solution” (p. 200), where the two biggest
obstacles to alliances are the problem of free-riders and the prob-
lem of coordination. Coordination to achieve common goals is
necessary for coalitions, and it is also necessary that coopera-
tors are not outcompeted by free-riders. We have evolved both
anti-free rider adaptations and coordination adaptations. Tooby
and Cosmides indicate that adaptations for coordination include
programs implementing
a theory of groupmind; programs implementing a theory of inter-
ests; programs implementing a theory of human nature; programs
for leadership and followership; the outrage system; theory of
mind; co-registration programs for solving common knowledge
problems; language; and an underlying species-typical system of
situation representation which frames issues in similar ways for
different individuals
(Tooby and Cosmides, 2010, p. 202).
Sharing the same evolved architecture, they claim, provides a par-
tial foundation for resolving the game theoretic problem of com-
mon knowledge with finite cognitive resources. For cooperative
action to be taken, evolved procedures must exist for inducing or
recognizing sufficient coordination in situation representation.
Among the adaptations that contribute to coordination are
our emotional responses. Specific emotions are evolved systems
of internal coordination, activated in response to evolutionarily
recurrent situations such as danger, contamination, conflict or
pleasure.
More generally, there seems to be a psychophysics of mutual
coordination and coregistration, involving (for example) joint
attention and mutual gaze, especially timed when salient new
information could be expected to activate emotional or evalua-
tive responses in one’s companions. The benefits of coregistration
and mental coordination can explain (at least in part) an appetite
for co-experiencing (watching events is more pleasurable with
friends and allies), the motivation to share news with others, for
emotional contagion, for gravitation in groups toward common
evaluations, for aversion to dissonance in groups, for conformity,
for mutual arousal to action as with mobs (payoffs shift when oth-
ers are coordinated with you), and so on.
(Tooby and Cosmides, 2010, p. 205).
The research about the evolution of taste and disgust, the educa-
tion of taste, and eating customs, illustrates this broad description
of the importance of coordination in human cognition. I men-
tion briefly the case of what is disgusting, after (Rozin and Fallon,
1987; Rozin, 1996). Here is a very short summary of the expla-
nation. As omnivores, humans have a very varied diet, but this
means that they are at a high risk of consuming toxic substances.
The evolution of gustatory taste permits discriminating poten-
tially edible things. According to Rozin, disgust is the fear of
incorporating an offending substance into one’s body. The things
that humans find disgusting things are, mostly, those coming
from animals (in particular, some animal parts, like tongues and
other internal organs). But there is a problem: it seems there is
a wide variability in what is found disgusting (and conversely,
tasty) from culture to culture, which suggests that there is a cru-
cial learning period. Elizabeth (Cashdan, 1994) argues that there
is indeed a sensitive period for learning about food in the first
2–3 years of a child’s life. After 3 years, children’s tastes diminish
drastically. Coordinating eating habits with those of the imme-
diate group may be one of the first requirements for survival. It
then becomes a way of identifying one’s group and community.
Pinker (1997) discusses the significant case of food taboos.
According to him, food taboos indicate that the coordination of
eating habits with those of one’s group is important because it
contributes to strengthening the cohesion of the group. Being
able to eat together may permit the formation of new alliances.
The feast days of many religions have as a central component rit-
uals involving food and “breaking bread together” (Pinker, 1997,
p. 385).
Now, conflicts may occur in actual situations where coordina-
tion toward common goals may be hindered—for instance, when
Clarissa and Jennifer cannot agree on what they should eat. On
the other hand, conflicts may occur in evolutionarily recurrent
situations that have posed coordination problems, and thus led
to the selection of specific emotional responses (responses toward
edible things, toward dangerous or pleasurable situations, toward
other people or their actions).
The conjecture here advanced is that in cases of this kind—
where sharing the relevant dispositions has played a role in
finding coordination solutions in recurrent situations—the exis-
tence of divergent emotional responses is perceived as signaling
potential conflicts, and thus ground the conflict among conative
non-doxastic attitudes: not all of their desires will be satisfied.
The conjecture is illustrated by the case of tasty and disgusting
things. Being disposed to eat the same sort of things enables fur-
ther cooperation and altruistic behavior, and is more likely to lead
to future benefits. Humans have evolved to approve of others with
similar dispositions, and have evolved to disapprove of others
with dissonant dispositions. Not being similarly disposed in some
relevant aspects may hinder further cooperation. The desires that
concern the benefits that result from others’ cooperative behavior
toward oneself may fail to be satisfied.
This research supports the claim that humans have a prefer-
ence for consonance and an aversion to dissonance in certain
kinds of dispositions. Other research supports the claim that
certain modes of cognition are first-person plural or de nobis.
Frith and Frith (2012) have recently reviewed the recent work
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in cognitive science and psychology on the various “mechanisms
of social cognition.” Among such mechanisms are, for instance,
empathy or emotional contagion that permit alignment of repre-
sentations, as well as forward modeling that allows the prediction
of other’s behavior. Some of the neural mechanisms involved in
the observation of others and in learning, at the implicit level,
are association, reward, gaze following and mirroring. Ongoing
research on these mechanisms of social cognition is revealing the
role they play in learning, cooperation, and language acquisition.
4. Consequences
How does the conjecture fir in with (i) the dispositional account
of values a la Lewis that is being here assumed, andwith (ii) a con-
textualist semantic account of evaluative predicates in general?
The Lewisian theory is not only internalist and cognitivist, but
it is also naturalist. Values are dispositional states. If any disposi-
tional theory is correct, it has to fit with what the best theories of
the natural and social sciences tell us about the relevant kind of
dispositions. Evolutionary psychologists’ work on the evolution
of altruism and cooperation, and on the evolution of the sense
of taste for instance, corroborates a dispositional theory, at least
with respect to taste properties. It may be that further research on
the mechanisms of social cognition will tell us more about the x
character of such dispositions.
This paper started with a discussion of challenges to contextu-
alist semantics. The issue was whether a contextualist semantic
account of evaluative predicates like “tasty,” “disgusting” (and
others more robust than taste predicates) can accommodate
and explain disagreement data. A contextualist semantics that
respects the metaphysical view of evaluative properties as sec-
ondary or dispositional properties of the sort discussed here will
allow for the possibility that two speakers may be in dispute over
different evaluative properties. One speaker may express a prop-
erty about group1 to which she belongs, i.e., that it values X,
and another speaker expresses a property about group2 to which
she belongs, i.e., that it does not value X. Both speakers may be
speaking truly. Wasn’t this the main objection to contextualist
accounts, that there seems to be some sense of disagreement left
that cannot now be captured by the semantics? On a dispositional
theory like Lewis’s account, we have an explanation that covers
doxastic disagreements, as well as an explanation of conflicting
desires, where such a conflict exists if and when interlocutors are
members of the same group. This could however mean that the
challenge of lost doxastic disagreement results in a challenge of
lost conflict of attitudes too. Or does it?
Contextualists have appealed to presuppositions of common-
ality to deal with the challenge of lost disagreement—we suppose
that our interlocutors are like us in the relevant respects. They
have appealed to metalinguistic disputes about the selection of
standards—even if we are both speaking truly, we may in fact be
engaged in a dispute over what standard should be implemented.
And they have moreover appealed to conflicting conative atti-
tudes that in any case remain. The main aim of this paper was
to show the need to say more about these kinds of explanation.
What drives disputes over the selection of evaluative standards,
and why does it matter that common standards be accepted?
What makes it the case that a pair of conative attitudes are in
conflict? What is the role of coordination in finding common
standards and in attitudinal conflicts? Keeping in line with the
naturalistic motivation for a dispositional account of value prop-
erties, the paper has offered a brief review of some of the central
research in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science that
can begin to fill in the blanks, connecting on the one hand dis-
positions that help to find solutions to recurrent coordination
problems, and on the other hand evaluative thought and dis-
course in general. Does this put us in a better position to answer
the challenges of disagreement and conflict?
On the contextualist account, Clarissa and Jennifer express
distinct but equally true propositions. This offers a semantic
implementation of the relational account of the dispositional
properties expressed by taste predicates. But contextualists about
predicates of taste and value face the challenge of explaining how
two people can accept different true propositions and nonetheless
disagree. The suggestion here offered tried to develop the propos-
als put forward by López de Sa, Sundell, Huvenes, and Marques
and García-Carpintero, by offering what the appeals to presup-
positions of commonality, metalinguistic disputes and conflicting
non-doxastic attitudes were missing.
The impression that there is a doxastic disagreement could
presumably be explained by the existence of folk invariantist
semantic intuitions. But there seem to be resilient disagreements
even where semantically informed speakers like Clarissa and Jen-
nifer still insist on uttering sentences like (1a) “Cow’s tongue is
disgusting” and (1b) “No, it isn’t, it’s delicious!” These can be
presumably explained as metalinguistic disagreements over the
selection of an appropriate standard, as Sundell proposes. What
distinguishes cases like (1) from cases where speakers simply
express their individual preferences, like (7), is that the former
cases trigger presuppositions of commonality that the latter do
not. But other cases of presupposition failure do not generate dis-
agreements; in fact, learning that a presupposition fails usually
dispels disagreements. We can anyway assume that a conflict of
attitudes remains. If these attitudes were simply the expression of
individual desires, and since two people with different personal
desires can both be satisfied, it is hard to see what the cause of the
remaining conflict can be. I have offered a broader explanation of
conflicting conative attitudes, in line with a dispositional theory.
However, this explanation still leaves us with a problem: if, on
assumption, what Clarissa and Jennifer say is true with respect to
their respective standard (which concerns two distinct groups),
and if their non-doxastic attitudes are in conflict only if they con-
cern the same group, then we still do not have an explanation of
the conflict of attitudes.
In Section 2.3, I pointed to the fact that group membership
cannot be the sort of thing that depends exclusively on one’s
occurring desires. Onemay be mistaken at a givenmoment about
one’s overall dispositions, and one’s occurring desires may be
affected by extraneous causes. Moreover, one may be mistaken at
any given time about what one’s group values. Also, group iden-
tity and membership cannot depend exclusively on one’s conver-
sational interlocutors in a context. It is not that whatever is a value
is whatever the interlocutors in a conversation are disposed to
value; context contributes to determine which value property is
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expressed in a context. As a simplified illustration, context deter-
mines whether by “tasty” the interlocutors mean tasty for people
with sophisticated gourmet training, or tasty for the typical north-
European 3 year old child. But a conversational context does not
constitute the value property itself. The property at stake, what-
ever it is, is whatever the relevant group is disposed to value in
the right conditions.
The concern that contextualist explanations are limited
to intracontextual disputes does not arise straightforwardly.
Because the relevant group’s identity, membership and compo-
sition are not context-dependent matters, whether or not there is
a disagreement or a conflict of attitudes is not straightforwardly
a result of whether two people participate in the same conversa-
tion. Rather, it is a result of whether their doxastic or conative
attitudes are compatible or in conflict. Finally, group identity and
group membership may be indeterminate. This indeterminacy,
together with some indeterminacy concerning whatwe should do
in ideal conditions of full imaginative acquaintance, leaves ample
room for meaningful disputes about evaluative matters, and for
metadisputes about what values we should share.
In the previous section, I reviewed some work that shows the
importance of common evaluations for cooperative projects. The
possibly variable extension of a given group (and the indetermi-
nacy of the group identity and extension in question), together
with “the benefits of coregistration and mental coordination” can
at bottom be the reason why, even when people have different
standards, they strive to establish a common ground, or, to put it
another way, to extend group membership. Attitudinal conflicts
can endure wherever there are expectations concerning what we,
together, should come to value.
This is, in summary, a rephrasing of Lewis’s conditionally rel-
ative view. There is no absolute answer as to who we are: “What
I mean to commit myself to is conditionally relative: relative if
need be, but absolute otherwise” (Lewis, 1989, p. 85).
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